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POLICE DISCRETION AND LOCAL IMMIGRATION
POLICYMAKING
Rick Su*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a local police department confronted with the issue of
immigration. With a growing immigrant population in the community and
increasing federal emphasis on local involvement in immigration enforcement,
the police chief realizes that it is no longer possible to ignore the immigration
consequences of even the most ordinary of police activity. At the same time,
concerned about the deleterious effects of immigration enforcement on local
policing priorities, and the potential abuse that might arise from giving unbridled
discretion to line-level officers under his charge, the police chief feels it is
important to promulgate an official policy on how immigration issues will be
addressed as a departmental matter. On the one hand, the policy he arrives at
prohibits any local police officer from inquiring about or otherwise contacting
federal authorities in regards to an individual's immigration status if that person
is not under arrest on suspicions of having committed a felony offense. On the
other hand, for those who are arrested for a felony violation, it requires the
arresting officer to take steps to determine their immigration status and alert
federal authorities if any are identified as being unlawfully present in the United
States. This essay begins with the proposition that irrespective of the
disagreements that we may have about the particularities of such a policy, broad
agreement may nevertheless be reached on the merits of having departmental
directives to guide the conduct of line-level officers. Yet, as this essay argues,
recent legal developments are calling such local policymaking into serious doubt,
both with respect to limitations on immigration enforcement and mandate to
participate.
Immigration responsibilities in the United States are formally charged to
a broad range of federal agencies, from the overseas screening of the State
Department to the border patrols of the Department of Homeland Security. Yet
in recent years, no department seems to have received more attention than that of
the local police. A robust public debate now rages over the wisdom of involving
local law enforcement officials in the enforcement federal immigration laws.' At

* Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo Law School; B.A.,
Dartmouth College, J.D., Harvard Law School. Special thanks to Mark Bartholomew, Sagit
Levener, and other participants of the Junior Faculty Workshop at Buffalo Law School.
1See, e.g., David A. Harris, The War on Terror, Local Police, and Immigration Enforcement: A
Curious Tale of Police Power in Post-9/11 America, 38 RuTGERS L.J. 1, 7 (2007); Huyen Pham,
The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal Immigration
Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 1373, 1381 (2006) [hereinafter Pham, Right Not to Cooperate];Michael
Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084
(2004).
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the same time, legal opinions range from those who feel such participation is
constitutionally required to those who believe that it is constitutionally
prohibited. 2 Indeed, as momentum gains for the next round of immigration
reforms, there is a growing sense that sorting out what role, if any, local law
enforcement plays will be one of the central issues.
Immigration is, of course, not a local law enforcement responsibility.
Nevertheless, there are many reasons why the immigration focus is starting to
shift from federal agents to the local police. The sheer number of local officials
in our uniquely decentralized system of law enforcement represents, for some, an
enticing "force multiplier" while, for others, an unmanageable liability.3 In
addition, as immigration is becoming increasingly connected to such local issues
as crime control, housing, neighborhood transitions, and quality of life, people
are increasingly looking to the police as "first-responders" of sorts with respect to
emerging immigration-fueled controversies. Given all this, it is no wonder that
so many localities and police departments have embarked on the task of
considering, adopting, and revising policies that govern how their officials
respond to immigration issues in the field.4 Nor is it surprising that, in response
to some of these policies, both the federal government and the states have begun
to exercise their regulatory power in an effort to proscribe such local
policymaking efforts-and have done so both for and against local participation
in immigration enforcement.5 These efforts to restrict how local law enforcement
agencies set policies regarding immigration enforcement for their officers are the
focus of this essay. The argument here is that rather than clarifying or
standardizing local immigration enforcement practices, they enhance individual
police discretion at the expense of departmental supervision.
On the surface, the trend toward increasing regulation of local
immigration policymaking appears to be a welcome development. Uniform
treatment, centralized administration, and specialized expertise have long been
considered hallmarks of immigration regulation generally, and these features
have long been thought to be more likely found at the federal and state level than

2 Compare,e.g.,

Huyen Pham, The InherentFlaws in the InherentAuthority Position: Why Inviting
Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws Violate the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 965
(2004) [hereinafter Pham, Inherent Flaws] (arguing that local immigration enforcement is
constitutionally prohibited), with Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and State Sanctuary Declarations:
Innocuous Symbolism or ImproperDictates?, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 297, 316-20 (1989) (arguing that it
is unconstitutional for local law enforcement not to enforce federal immigration laws).
Compare Kris W. Kobach, The QuintessentialForceMultiplier: The InherentAuthority ofLocal
Police to Make Immigration Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REv. 179 (2005), with Wishnie, supra note 1, at
1012-45.
4 See, e.g., Mike Glenn, HPD Turns over 3 to Immigration Officials, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 20, 2006,
at B3; Jesse McKinley, San Franciscoat a Crossroadson Immigration, S.F. CHRON., June 13,
2009, at A12.
s See infra Part III.
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at the local.6 But upon closer examination, it is not clear that the haphazard and
politicized manner in which the federal government and the states are starting to
regulate local policymaking is all that effective in advancing these interests.
Moreover, by targeting local policies directly, these restrictions undermine the
supervisory relationship between line-level law officers and the departments they
work for and the communities that they serve.
Admittedly, given that the legal developments considered here are all
relatively new, their impact and significance are largely unsettled. The purpose
of this essay, then, is to serve as a preliminary examination of an emerging
regulatory framework and its potential consequences on immigration regulation
and local policing. To this end, this essay proceeds as follows. Part II
reexamines the need for local immigration policymaking in light of the changing
nature of federal immigration law and the needs of modern policing.
Notwithstanding this need, Part III shows how legal developments in recent years
are making such policies increasingly hard to adopt at the local level. Further,
rather than foreclosing local involvement in immigration, these developments
have actually expanded the role of local law enforcement officials by making
After
their immigration-related activities harder to regulate or control.
a
truly
of
emergence
the
make
explaining why federalism constraints
comprehensive federal- or state-mandated set of procedures unlikely, Part IV
suggests that local policymaking is the most viable alternative to unfettered
police discretion. This is followed by a brief conclusion.
II. REASSESSING THE NEED FOR LOCAL POLICYMAKING
Immigration policymaking at the local level has long been an area of
substantial controversy. This is particularly true when they concern the conduct
of local law enforcement officials. Notwithstanding all the attention, however,
most of the debates thus far have centered on the relative merits of
experimentation versus uniformity, or on the wisdom of particular policy
prescriptions.8 Of course, given that nearly any comprehensive policy, no matter

Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-RelatedState andLocal Ordinances:Preemption,Prejudice,
andthe ProperRole for Enforcement, 2007 U. CH. LEGAL. F. 27, 53 (2007); Pham, InherentFlaws,
supranote 2, at 987-98.
7 See e.g., Pham, Inherent Flaws, supranote 2, at 987-98 (asserting the importance of centralization
and uniformity); Victor C. Romero, Devolution andDiscrimination,58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L.
377, 381-85 (2002) (challenging the argument that devolution of immigration policymaking would
serve as a check against federal discrimination); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration
Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1627 (1997) (arguing that local participation serves as a "steamIndeed, I have focused on these broader issues of
valve" for federal immigration policy).
centralization versus decentralization before. See Rick Su, Immigration as Urban Policy,
38 FORDHAM URB. L. REv. 363, 366-75 (2010).
8 See e.g., Kobach, supra note 3 (asserting role of local enforcement); Pham, Right Not to
Cooperate, supra note 1 (defending sanctuary policies); Laura Sullivan, Enforcing
6 See
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how finely balanced, faces criticism from one or more sides in the immigration
debates, it is no wonder that local policymaking in this area have received
relatively little support.
This Part defends the role of local policymaking with respect to
immigration. It does so, however, not by arguing the merits of any specific
policy or the value of decentralized power. Rather, I posit here that having some
policy to guide the conduct of local law enforcement authorities is, in most cases,
simply better than having none at all. Indeed, as I show below, the absence of a
departmental policy on immigration does not necessarily mean immigration
becomes irrelevant as a local issue; given the manner in which the federal
government is now regulating and enforcing our nation's immigration laws, even
the most mundane police activities are likely to have immigration consequences.
In most cases, the absence of local policies simply means that the ultimate
discretion over how immigration matters are handled is devolved to individual
police officers to decide in the field. In this regard, even if police officers can
often be trusted to exercise sound judgment, the dangers of unfettered and
unsupervised discretion should also not be underestimated, whether from the
perspective of immigration enforcement or local policing.

A. The Convergence of Immigration and Local Policing
Of course, given that immigration is so uniquely federal, it needs to be
asked why local leaders even need to concern themselves with immigration. This
section suggests that one answer lies in the manner in which the issue of
immigration is now being handled at the federal level. With increasing federal
interest in local cooperation, local police often have no choice but to consider
what their stance on immigration enforcement might be. Moreover, recent
reforms to how immigration is regulated means that federal immigration law is
now, more than ever, intertwined with nearly every aspect of local policing.
What this means is that ignoring immigration as a matter of policing today is not
only becoming increasingly difficult for local policymakers, but is likely to be
just as much a policy position as one officially promulgated.
In the early days of federal regulation, it was easy to treat immigration
enforcement and local policing as distinct and separate endeavors. This made
sense when the primary federal focus was border security and overseas
screening. 9 However, with public and federal attention now fixed on the
burgeoning population of undocumented immigrants within the United States and
federal efforts increasingly turning towards interior enforcement strategies, the
line between federal and local is fast eroding. Local participation is now
prominently featured in several major enforcement initiatives at the federal

Nonenforcement: Counteringthe Threat Posedto SanctuaryLaws by the Inclusion of Immigration
Records in the NationalCrime Information CenterDatabase,97 CAL. L. REv. 567 (2009) (same).
9 See ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION PouCY IN THE FASHIONING OF
AMERICA 244 (2006).
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level. 1o Moreover, the unprecedented dispersal of immigrant populations to
regions that, up until now, had few immigrants and thus a small number of
federal immigration officials has prompted the federal government to be even
more aggressive in seeking the assistance of local law enforcement as a
substitute." In light of these developments, if immigration is becoming more
prominent in local policymaking, it is in large part because the federal
government's enforcement strategy is increasingly requiring that it be placed on
local agendas.
At the same time, the changing structure of our immigration laws is
making it more difficult for local law enforcement agencies to ignore the
immigration consequences of their officer's actions in the field. With each round
of legal reforms, our nation's focus has been steadily gravitating away from
refining the immigration categories that determine who may enter. Instead, the
focus has steadily shifted towards regulations that seek to influence immigration
flows by curtailing the entitlement and protections of immigrants already
admitted, including greatly expanding the circumstances in which admitted
immigrants can be removed.12 A significant development along these lines is the
dramatic expansion of criminal offenses that can now lead to deportation. 3 One
consequence is that a removal category once reserved for the most serious
offenders now includes relatively minor offenses like check fraud and petty theft.
Another is that the state criminal justice system and the federal immigration
regime are now, more than ever, inextricably intertwined.14 Indeed, the shadow
of federal deportation looms so large that it is nearly impossible to ignore its
relevance at every stage of state criminal proceedings, especially in jurisdictions
with large immigrant populations. Even the Supreme Court, which has long

1o See
LAW:

LISA M. SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32270, ENFORCING IMMIGRATION
THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 3 (2009), available at

http://www.au.af.mil/aulawc/awcgate/crs/rl32270.pdf.
" See Jerry Seper, Sheriffs Deputies Help ICE Roundup Illegal Aliens, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 28,
2006, at A5.
12 See Daniel Kanstrom, Deportation,Social Control,and Punishment:
Some Thoughts about Why
Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1889, 1907-08 (2000); Juliet Stumpf, States of
Confision: The Rise of State and Local Power over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 1581-82
(2008).
1 See Jennifer M. Chacon, Unsecured Borders: Immigration Restrictions, Crime Control and
National Security, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1827, 1827-32 (2007); Teresa Miller, Citizenship and
Severity: Recent ImmigrationReforms andthe New Penology, 10 GEO. IMM. L.J. 611 (2003); Juliet
Stumpf, The CrimmigrationCrisis:Immigrants, Crime, andSovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV.
367 (2006).
14 See Daniel Kanstroom, Criminalizing the Undocumented: Ironic Boundaries of the PostSeptember 11th "Pale of Law," 29 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 639, 651 (2004); Stephanie
Czekalinski, Dispatch Investigation: Deportation Nation, Justice Denied, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Dec. 6, 2010, at Al (noting the lack ofcoordination between local and federal agents and how that
sometimes thwarts the mission of the criminal justice system when the issue of immigration is
involved).
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distinguished deportation as a civil matter, seems to be finding it harder to see
immigration as entirely distinct from criminal law.'
What all this means is that even if immigration continues to be primarily
a federal responsibility, it is no longer possible for local law enforcement to
remain silent on immigration-related issues as a matter of departmental policy. It
is important to note that many of the legal pressures are external; most local law
enforcement officials are hardly eager to participate in this federal endeavor. Yet
as local participation in federal immigration enforcement is increasingly being
sought by federal authorities, localities and local law enforcement departments
are being explicitly called upon to examine their role. 1 Moreover, as
immigration becomes more interwoven with criminal law, even basic law
enforcement decisions such as which suspects will be detained and the offenses
with which they will be charged necessarily carry significant immigration
consequences. For many jurisdictions, immigration now permeates nearly every
aspect of policing.

B. Trends in Policing and Police Supervision
As the above showed, one reason why local law enforcement agencies
are engaged in immigration policymaking is because of the growing influence of
federal immigration laws on everyday policing. This section suggests that
another reason is the importance of policymaking more generally to the
administration of policing. In other words, the enactment of local policies on
immigration is also a response to the needs of modem policing.
With the expansion of police forces around the country, policing today is
increasingly focused on bureaucratic administration. Alongside issues such as
balancing budgets and managing priorities, there is a growing emphasis on
personnel management at the departmental level, especially with respect to the
broad discretion traditionally enjoyed by line-level officers. " To be sure,
discretion remains an important part of effective and responsive policing; given
the myriad responsibilities and countless scenarios that they face, it is difficult to
imagine policing as a rote activity in which no discretion is entrusted.' 8 At the

1s See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480, 1483 (holding that failure to warn a criminal
defendant about the immigration consequences of a plea may constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel); see also Teresa Miller, Lessons Learned, Lessons Lost: Immigration Enforcement's
Failed Experiment with Penal Severity, 38 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 217, 233 ("Never before had
scholars broadly discussed the relationship between certain immigration processes (like
deportation) and crime control in terms ofconvergence or merger.").
16 See Harris,supranote 1, at 29-32.
17 See generally MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET: POLICE DISCRETION AND THE
DILEMMAS OF REFORM (1988).

' See Hadar Avirarn & Daniel L. Portman, InequitableEnforcement: Introducing the Concept of
Equity into ConstitutionalReview ofLaw Enforcement, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 413, 423 (2009).
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same time, it is often abuses of that discretion that lead to police misconduct and
departmental corruption.19
The proper balancing of this discretion has long been a concern for
courts.20 Yet the management of police discretion has also been a major theme
within the world of policing itself. Take, for example, the rise of the professional
police force. With historical roots in the progressive reform movement of the
early twentieth century, the movement toward professionalization stresses,
among other things, the need for clear departmental standards, guidelines, and
protocols as a means of curbing corruption, brutality, and other abuses. 21
Another is the growing interest in community policing. A response to anti-police
sentiment bred by the increasing militarization of police departments in the 1980s
and early 1990s, the community policing model is founded upon the idea that
effective policing requires enlisting neighborhood cooperation and cultivating
community trust. 22 There are tensions between professionalization and
community policing, to be sure.2 3 What these movements share, however, is
recognition of the importance of departmental supervision over the conduct of
line-level officers. Supervision is not only important to the administration of a
modern police force as the professional police model stresses, it is also central to
the successful implementation of specific initiatives like community policing.
Though developed in response to concerns about policing more
generally, the increasing relevance of federal immigration laws to everyday
police activities now means that immigration is also of concern to professional
and community policing. As the infamous Rampart Scandal that rocked the Los
Angeles Police Department in the late 1990s demonstrates, 24 incidents of
corruption, intimidation, and other police misconduct frequently involve
exploitation of the legal vulnerabilities created by federal immigration
regulations.25 Similarly, with the growth of immigrant communities in nearly
every major police jurisdiction, community policing is increasingly attuned to
gaining their trust and cooperation in order to effectively keep peace in and
around immigrant neighborhoods.2 6 Language and ethnicity already operate as

1

See

SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE,

1950-1990, 21(1993); Erik K. Luna, TransparentPolicing,85 IOWA L. REv. 1107, 1108-21(2000).
20 See generally Aviram & Portman, supra
note 18.
21 See STEVEN KELLY HERBERT, POLICING SPACE: TERRITORIALITY AND THE Los ANGELES POLICE
DEPARTMENT 59-63 (1997).
22 See generally ROBERT R. FRIEDMANN, COMMUNITY POLICING: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES AND

PROSPECTS (1992).
23 See

id. at 73 (describing conflicts between professionalization and community policing, even as
both are occurring simultaneously).
24 The Rampart Scandal involved an anti-gang unit in the Los Angeles Police Department that
was
revealed to have stolen and sold drugs and "framed, planted evidence on, turned over to the INS,
and even beat and shot suspects in the name of gang suppression." ROBERT GOTTLIEB ET AL., THE
NEXT Los ANGELES: THE STRUGGLE FOR A LIVABLE CITY 123 (2006).
25
See Anne-Marie O'Connor, Rampart Set up Latinos to Be Deported,INS Says, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
24, 2000, at 1.
26 See Harris, supra note 1,
at 37-38.
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barriers between many police departments and the immigrant communities that
they serve. Yet, as many have noted, another important factor is whether and
how line-level police officers are instructed to handle immigration issues that
may arise in the course of their everyday duties. For example, fear of detection
may prevent undocumented crime victims and witnesses from assisting police in
their investigations.2 7 Moreover, as more families include members with both
legal and undocumented status, such policies affect police interactions with legal
residents in the community as well, even if they have no fears of being subject to
deportation themselves.2 8
C. Pragmatism and Policymaking
In light of the growing influence of federal immigration laws on the
everyday operations of policing, it is no surprise that local law enforcement
agencies have shown an interest and awareness of immigration issues. Indeed,
local law enforcement officials are oftentimes more attuned to such concerns
than other local leaders. A 2005 study conducted in California showed that while
most local leaders reported that immigrants and ethnic organizations had very
little contact with and influence on city hall, heads of local police departments
demonstrated the highest awareness of immigrant needs and expressed the
strongest interest in reaching out and establishing tangible relationships with their
communities. 2 9 Today, as the controversy over local immigration enforcement
escalates, police chiefs and law continue to express interest in how immigration
and federal immigration laws affect their work.30
Similarly, given the need to manage how their personnel respond to
immigration issues in the field, more and more local law enforcement agencies
are turning to policymaking. A recent survey showed that approximately half of
all police chiefs and county sheriffs participating in the survey reported that their
department had some kind of policy instructing officers what to do regarding
immigration status.3 ' To be sure, accounts of these policies tend to fixate on
sensational enforcement dragnets like those lead by Sheriff Arpaio in Arizona 3 2

27
28

See Sullivan, supra note 8, at 579-82.
See Pham, Right Not to Cooperate,supranote 1, at 1399-1400.

29 See S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN & PAUL G. LEWIS, PuB. PoL'Y INST. OF CAL., IMMIGRANTS AND

LOCAL GOVERNANCE: THE VIEW FROM CITY HALL 33-34, 75-76 (2005).

30 See generally, Debra A. Hoffmaster et al., Police Executive Research Forum, Police and
Immigration: How Chiefs Are Leading Their Communities through the Challenges (Mar. 2011),
http://www.policeforum.org/library/immigration/PERFImmigrationReportMarch20 11.pdf.
31 See Scott H. Decker et al., Immigration and Local Policing: Results from a National Survey of
Law Enforcement Executives, in THE ROLE OF LOCAL POLICE: STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN
2009),
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 176 (Mary Malina ed.,

http://policefoundation.org/indexStriking.html.
32 See, e.g., Editorial, Immigration Outsourced, N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/09/opinion/09wed1.btml?_r-1.
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or exaggerated portrayals of cities like San Francisco as lawless sanctuaries.
Most policies, however, tend to be quite pragmatic in their approach-balancing
competing interests and emphasizing the role of departmental supervision in
close cases. Take, for example, the immigration policy of the Denver Police
Department. On the one hand, it instructs its officers not to "initiate police
actions with the primary objective of discovering the immigration status of a
person" and to refrain from taking "enforcement action against a person solely
because he/she is suspected of being an undocumented immigrant."3 4 On the
other hand, enforcement action can be taken with "the approval of an on duty
supervisor or commander," and "suspects believed to be an undocumented
immigrant .. . [and] arrested for other charges" are to be tagged and referred to
federal authorities by county officials.3 s
Of course, departmental supervision in general is still far from ideal.
Most law enforcement agencies have implemented no policy or procedure for
their officers to follow. Further, in jurisdictions where policies exist, it is not
unusual for them to be unwritten, unclear, or under-enforced. 36 As a result, not
only are officers in the field often confused about their course of action, but the
communities are uncertain about how local law enforcement will respond. In
light of these and other issues, many have stressed the need for local law
enforcement agencies to clarify and publicize their policies and adequately train
their officers about their requirements. 37 Yet, as suggested below, the limitations
of immigration policymaking may not simply be the result of failures in police
administration or gaps in local government oversight. Rather, emerging legal
restrictions on the adoption of these policies may also be an important culprit.
III. RESTRICTING LOCAL POLICYMAKING
As the foregoing illustrated, there are good reasons as to why local law
enforcement agencies should be encouraged to promulgate clear and transparent
Yet, as this Part shows, recent legal
policies regarding immigration. 3
developments at the federal and state level have been pushing in the opposite

See McKinley, supra note 4 ("San Francisco found itself under criminal investigation by the
United States attorney for the Northern District of California, and city officials were eager to show
that their city was not a lawless haven for illegal-immigrant criminals.").
34 See DENVER POLICE DEP'T, POLICE DEPARTMENT OPERATIONS MANUAL § 104.52(3)(a)-(b)
(2010), availableat http://www.denvergov.org/Portals/326/documents/104.pdf.
3

36 See Decker, supranote 31, at 176; Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism,Deportation,and Crime Victims
Afraid to Call the Police,91 IowA L. REV. 1449, 1482-84 (2006).
3 See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 8, at 597-99.
38 It may be that the federal government may need to develop more transparent and clear policies
with respect to the immigration enforcement by federal agents as well. See generally U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-67, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: ICE COULD IMPROVE
CONTROLS TO HELP GUIDE ALIEN REMOVAL DECISION MAKING (2007), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0867.pdf.
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direction. First, growing restrictions on different types of law enforcement
policies are steadily narrowing the scope of permissible local policymaking.
Second, by targeting local policymaking alone, and not the underlying conduct of
police officers in the field, these restrictions on departmental policies and
supervision are actually leading to a broad expansion of police discretion at the
level of line-level officers.

A. Limiting Non-Enforcement
The movement against local immigration policymaking is being pursued
most earnestly in the context of local non-enforcement policies. At the heart of
this is the controversy over so-called "sanctuary cities," which refer to
jurisdictions where the ability of line-level officers to participate in or contribute
to federal immigration enforcement efforts is limited in some way. To be sure,
localities often contest their designation as sanctuary cities,3 9 especially those
whose policies include a combination of enforcement and non-enforcement
mandates tailored to different circumstances. Yet as a general matter, the
sanctuary designation is generally used to refer to policies that include one or
more of the following provisions: (1) "don't ask" policies that limit independent
investigations of an individual's immigration status, (2) "don't tell" policies that
limit communications between local law enforcement officers and federal
authorities, and (3) "don't enforce" policies that limit the ability to arrest and
detain for the purpose of immigration enforcement.40
Sanctuary policies vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Despite
this variation, they are often justified on similar grounds. Many believe such
policies are necessary to gain the trust and cooperation of immigrant
communities, who may otherwise avoid approaching local police for fear of
entangling themselves or their communities in an immigration dragnet or the
possibility of police harassment. 4 1 Indeed, many law enforcement officials have
expressed concern that local enforcement of federal immigration laws may
expose their officers to more allegations of civil rights violations.42 Others
articulate more economical considerations; they argue that immigration is a
federal responsibility and drains scarce and valuable local resources when local

See Mike Glenn, Debate FlaresAnew on HPD's Immigrant Policy, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 26,
2006, at Bl; see also Elise Foley, Communities Try to DistanceThemselves From 'SanctuaryCity'
Label, IOWA IND., Aug. 9, 2010, at http://iowaindependent.com/40829/communities-try-todistance-themselves-from-sanctuary-city-label; Reeve Hamilton & Matt Stiles, Houston,State Cops
2010,
4,
May
TRIB.,
TEX.
Policy,
Immigrant
Similar
Have
http://www.texastribune.org/immigration-in-texas/sanctuary-cities/houston-state-cops-have-similarimmigrant-policy. See generally Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a "Sanctuary?", 61 SMU L. REV.
133 (2008).
40 See Kittrie,supra note 36, at 1455;see also Sullivan, supra note 8, at 574.
41 See Harris,supra note 1, at 33-44; Sullivan, supranote 8, at 578-83.
42 See Frank Moraga, Police Balk at Having to Do 1NS Work; Several Local Agencies Denounce
Justice Plan,VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Apr. 6, 2002, at Bl.
3
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law enforcement involve themselves in the enforcement of federal laws. 43 Of
course, critiques of so-called sanctuary provisions are prevalent as well. As a
matter of immigration policymaking, they are often criticized for frustrating
national interests in federal immigration enforcement;" and as a matter of
policing, they are commonly called into question every time a sensational offense
is committed by a removable immigrant who might have evaded police detection
in the past.45
It was because of many of these reasons that the federal government
passed one of the earliest restrictions on local immigration policymaking. In a
pair of laws passed in 1996, Congress included two nearly identical provisions
barring any state and local government entity or official from "prohibit[ing] or in
any way restrict[ing] any [other] government entity or official from sending or
receiving ... information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful
or unlawful, of any individual."" The structure of this law is worth noting: rather
than requiring local cooperation directly, it encourages such cooperation by
prohibiting mayors, police chiefs, commanding officers, and the like from
instructing line-level police officers to refrain from communicating with or
otherwise assisting federal immigration authorities. To be sure, the federal antisanctuary provision does not mandate that police officers participate in federal
immigration enforcement. Moreover, as Los Angeles noted in successfully
defending its own policy, the federal law is largely limited to "don't tell" policies
that limit communications between local law enforcement and federal
authorities, 47 and as such does not specifically address "don't ask" or "don't
enforce" measures that limit independent inquiry, investigation, or enforcement.
Yet it is clear that Congress intended to compel as much local participation as it

43 See Karen Brandon, U.S. Weighs Local Role on Immigration; Some Police FearDual Duty

Would Hurt Minority Ties, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 2002, at 10; see also Denise Hoying & Parker
Stephens, General Provisions: Amend Chapter 80 of Title 36 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated, Related to General ProvisionsApplicable to Counties, Municipal Corporations,and
Other Governmental Entities, so as to Prohibit Immigration Sanctuary Policies by Local
GovernmentalEntities; Providefor Penalties;Providefor Related Matters; Provide an Effective
Date; Repeal Conflicting Laws; andfor Other Purposes, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 95, 105 (2009),
at,
available
http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3329&context=colpub-review.
4 See Villazor, supra note 39, at 136 ("This politically motivated disapproving use of the word
sanctuary has unfairly conflated legitimate state and local policies that serve local interests or
policies that comply with the Constitution or federal laws with legislation that is intended to
supersede immigration law.").
45 See, e.g., Peggy O'Hare, "Sanctuary" Policy Irks Some in HPD: Accused Killer Helped by
"Hands-off' Proviso,Hous. CHRON., Mar. 7, 2003, at A3 1.
4 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104193, 110 Stat. 2105, § 434 (prohibiting state and local governments from restricting government
employees who wish to provide immigration information to federal authorities); Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat.
3009 § 642 (same).
47 See Joel Rubin, Judge Backs LAPD Policy: Jurist Tosses out a Lawsuit Challenging Curbs on
Officers' ImmigrationInquiries, L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2008, at 1.
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could by making sure that no one can tell a local police officer to say "no."
Moreover, there are signs that the federal government is expressing interest in
using new federal laws against concealing, harboring, or shielding undocumented
immigrants from detection as a means of challenging new non-enforcement

measures. 4 8
Even more noteworthy than these federal restrictions is the flurry of antisanctuary activity at the state level in recent years. Since 2005, several states
including Missouri, Colorado, Tennessee, and Georgia have enacted similar
constraints on their own subdivisions. 4 9 Further, many of these laws take the
additional step of allowing the state to condition the receipt of state funding on
local compliance.so No constraint on local policymaking thus far, however,
matches the scope of Arizona's S.B. 1070, the controversial immigration
enforcement law passed in the summer of 2010." Though initially described by
some as "empowering" local enforcement, I have argued before that it is better
understood as an attack on local discretion given the way it mandates
52
enforcement activity regardless of any preexisting policies to the contrary. This
is highlighted by the fact that S.B. 1070 includes one of the most stringent antisanctuary provisions ever enacted. Not only does it prohibit any "policy that
limits or restricts the enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than the
full extent permitted by federal law," but it also takes the unprecedented step of
authorizing any resident of the state to sue any jurisdiction that violates this
mandate.53 Indeed, the "full extent permitted" language and the accompanying
cause of action against localities are so expansive that some have already
questioned whether they can even be applied in a literal manner. 54 Moreover, it
is important to note that although many provisions of S.B. 1070 have been
enjoined pursuant to a federal lawsuit, these provisions were specifically

See C.W. Nevius, Supe's Push on SanctuaryCouldBackfire, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 12, 2009, at Cl;
see also IND. CODE ANN. § 274A(a)(1)(A) (prohibiting harboring and concealing of undocumented
immigrants).
49
See Co. REv. STAT. § 29-29-101 (Supp. 2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-23 (Supp. 2009); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 67.307 (Supp. 2010).
50
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-23(c) ("Any local government body that acts in violation of
this Code section shall be subject to the withholding of state funding or state administered federal
funding other than funds to provide services specified in subsection (c) of Code section 50-36-1.");
Mo. REV. STAT. § 67.307(b)(2) ("Any municipality that enacts or adopts a sanctuary policy shall be
ineligible for any moneys provided through grants administered by any state agency or department
until the sanctuary policy is repealed or is no longer in effect.").
51 S.B. 1070, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 0113, amended by 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 0211 (H.B. 2162,
49th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010)).
52 Rick Su, Commentary, The Overlooked Significance of Arizona's New Immigration Law, 108
(2010),
77
76,
IMPRESSIONS
FIRST
REV.
L.
MICH.
http://www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/fi/108/su.pdf.
5 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § I1-1051(F)-(H) (Supp. 2010) (emphasis added).
54 Gabriel J. Chin et al., A Legal Labyrinth: Issues Raised by Arizona Senate Bill 1070, 25 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 47, 75 (2010).
48
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exempted from the injunction order and thus currently have full legal effect in

Arizona.ss
The emergence of these laws is understandable given the strong political
momentum behind increased enforcement. Yet it is notable that in targeting only
the policymaking powers of local law enforcement agencies, these restrictions
leave individual police discretion largely intact as a matter of law. Indeed, by
specifically targeting the ability of law enforcement agencies to limit actions
taken by its officers in the field, it can be argued that individual police discretion
is actually enhanced in practice. Line-level officers are still allowed to decide,
for example, to never contact federal immigration authorities in connection with
a routine traffic stop. Yet, while that discretion is preserved, anti-sanctuary laws
prevent any such decision from being instituted at a departmental level, or even
by an immediate supervisor with respect to the conduct of a line-level officer
directly under his supervision.
This split between individual and departmental discretion is not an
accident of the anti-sanctuary movement. This bifurcation has always been
important for two reasons. First, it is legally expedient. This is most clear at the
federal level where principles of federalism limit the federal government's ability
to mandate local participation in federal programs. 6 As the Second Circuit noted
in City of New York v. United States, the federal anti-sanctuary law did not
constitute an impermissible commandeering of the local policymaking process
or an unconstitutional conscription of local officials because it "prohibit[s] state
and local governmental entities or officials only from directly restricting the
voluntary exchange of immigration information" by their employees with
immigration authorities.5 7 Of course, this conclusion is dependent on treating
local law enforcement officials as distinct from the department and locality they
work for, even if they are formally a part of those entities when they are on duty.
Second, the bifurcation of individual discretion and departmental
discretion has also proven to be politically expedient. While attacking the
departments for which they work and the communities that they serve, political
efforts against sanctuary policies at the state level have often sought to drive a
wedge by appealing to the individual officers themselves. At a recent meeting of
the Combined Law Enforcement Associations of Texas, Governor Perry of Texas
advocated for a state-wide anti-sanctuary law by arguing that these local and
departmental policies have "handcuffed" them from doing the job that they swore

5 See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 986 (D. Ariz. 2010) aff'd, No. 10-16645,
2011 WL 1346945, at *20 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2011).
56 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that the federal government
lacked the power to force a state to choose to "take title" of low-level radioactive waste generated
within its borders or enact a state program for its disposal); see also United States v. Printz, 521
U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that the federal government could not "conscript" local law
enforcement officials to perform background checks on potential gun buyers in furtherance of a
federal program); id. at 931 n.15 (1997) (noting that there is no distinction between state and
federal governments with respect to the constitutional protections of federalism).
5 City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
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to do, and that the state intended to free them from those restraints. Similarly,
many of the state anti-sanctuary laws that have been passed not only restrict their
ability to limit enforcement through policymaking, but also require that the
departments specifically inform their officers about their right and duty to
cooperate directly with state and federal officials in immigration enforcement
matters regardless of what their department or commanding officers might say.59
Moreover, while Arizona's S.B. 1070 took the unique step of making law
enforcement agencies more vulnerable to suits for resisting immigration
enforcement in violation of the state law, it also specifically requires those same
law enforcement agencies to indemnify line-level officers who are sued for
carrying out immigration enforcement.60 The irony of this double bind in
Arizona is worth iterating: on the one hand, local police departments are unable
to limit immigration enforcement under state law for fear of state imposed
liability; on the other hand, they are also responsible for any lawsuits that may
arise from actions taken by law enforcement officers over whom they have
increasingly less control.
The expansion of the individual police discretion with respect to
immigration enforcement has also allowed for the expansion of formal antisanctuary laws indirectly. Take, for example, one of the limitations of the
original federal anti-sanctuary provision. As noted earlier, by focusing on
communications the law primarily addressed "don't tell" policies without
necessarily affecting, for example, "don't ask" variants. By preventing officers
from conducting independent investigations or inquiries, "don't ask" policies are
sometimes thought of as approximating "don't tell" policies by ensuring police
officers do not have any information to communicate to federal authorities even
if they are permitted to do so by federal law.' Yet with police discretion largely
intact, these workarounds are proving to be less than perfect substitutes. Writing
about the inclusion of immigration information in the FBI's National Crime
Information Center database, Laura Sullivan recently argued that this federal
initiative threatened to subvert local sanctuary policies by making the acquisition
of immigration information too automatic in the course of a law enforcement
official's everyday duties, and thus too easy for such officials to get involved in
immigration enforcement.62 Similar concerns were also raised in a special report

58 See James Pinkerton, Perry Vows to Abolish Sanctuary Cities in Texas, Hous. CHRON. TEX.
PM),
4:31
2010,
7,
(Oct.
BLOG
POLITICS

http://blogs.chron.com/texaspolitics/archives/2010/10/perryvows-to_a.html; see also Anna M.
Tinsley, Perry Takes Aim at Texas' Sanctuary Citiesfor Illegal Immigrants, FORT WORTH STARTELEGRAM, Oct. 9, 2010, http://www.star-telegram.com/2010/10/08/2532919/perry-takes-aim-attexas-sanctuary.html.
59
See Co. REv. STAT. §29-29-101 (2006); Mo. REv. STAT. § 67.307 (Supp. 2010).
6 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(K) (Supp. 2010).
61 Indeed, after rescinding its old "don't tell" sanctuary policy, New York City instituted a new
"don't ask" sanctuary policy. Susan Sachs, Mayor's New Immigrant Policy, Intended to Help,
RaisesFears,N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2003, at Al.
62 See Sullivan, supranote 8, at 569.
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commissioned after the Rampart Scandal severely tarred the reputation of the Los
Angeles Police Department. Finding that officers involved were able to get
around the department's "don't ask" policy by either working closely with
federal agents stationed in their field office, or simply calling in federal agents
when they wished to intimidate a witness or make them "disappear," the report
noted the need for stronger departmental oversight over communications between
police officers and federal authorities. Yet this is precisely the kind of limitations
that federal law specifically forecloses.6 3
B. Limiting Enforcement
Given the manner in which federal and state efforts have targeted local
non-enforcement policies in recent years, it would appear that if local law
enforcement agencies are to adopt any policies at all, it should be one that
emphasizes enforcement rather than restraint. Indeed, since the passage of the
federal anti-sanctuary law, federal policy seems to have been pushing precisely in
this direction. Local law enforcement officials are now authorized by Congress
to arrest undocumented immigrants in certain circumstances,6 and can enter into
an agreement with the federal government in which local officials are deputized
as federal enforcement agents. Moreover, the federal government is now
required by law to respond to any and all inquiries about immigration status from
local law enforcement officials, and federal agencies maintain several databases
and a special hotline for precisely this purpose. Moreover, for much of the last
decade the Department of Justice has stood behind a legal memo arguing that
local law enforcement officials have "inherent authority" to enforce federal
immigration laws with or without federal authorization.
So, can local law enforcement departments design policies that feature
steps toward immigration enforcement when certain conditions are met, say,
when a suspect has been arrested? Further, can a department actually requirethat
its officers perform certain actions, such as inquire about immigration status and
contact federal immigration authorities for verification if certain identification

63REPORT OF THE RAMPART INDEPENDENT REVIEW PANEL: A REPORT TO THE Los ANGELES BOARD
OF

POLICE

COMMISSIONERS

CONCERNING

SPECIAL

ORDER

40

9,

19

(Feb.

1,

2001),

http://www.oiglapd.org/Special Order40_70806 1v1 .pdf.

6 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252c (2006).
Congress allows state and local law enforcement agencies to enter into enforcement agreement
with the federal government, otherwise known as 287(g) agreements. See id. § 1357(g).
66
See id. § 1373(c) (requiring Department of Homeland Security to "respond to an inquiry by a
Federal, State, or local government agency, seeking to verify or ascertain the citizenship or
immigration status ... for any purpose authorized by law, by providing the requested verification
or status information").
67
See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the
Attorney General, Non-preemption of the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement Officials
to Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations 7-8 (Apr. 3, 2002), available at http://
www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf.
65
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documents are not forthcoming? Given much of the concern about local
immigration enforcement revolves around potential abuses that arise from the
improper exercise of police discretion, of which racial profiling has been the
most notable, the adoption of clear enforcement procedures and protocol that
both establish uniform guidelines and steer officers away from impermissible
factors might be both preferable and more amenable to debate and refinement
than ad hoc decision-making. Yet, as the rest of this section explains, not unlike
the legal restrictions on non-enforcement policies, recent developments are
starting to call these enforcement-oriented policies into question as well.
Admittedly, in comparison to our examination of anti-sanctuary
measures, the restrictions here are more tentative. That is because the most
significant legal development here is not the passage of a particular law. Rather,
it lies in the preemption argument that the federal government has raised against
Arizona's S.B. 1070, which, though successful at the district and appellate court
level, might still be subject to review by the Supreme Court.68 In light of this,
there are inherent limits to what can be predicted by the analysis below. To the
extent this challenge reflects emerging sentiments with respect to local
immigration mandates generally, however, the particular manner in which it is
being pursued may shine light on the kind of restrictions that may arise from
either this lawsuit or other developments going forward.
Arizona's S.B. 1070 has several provisions, many of which were directly
challenged by the federal government.
The most controversial of these
provisions, however, are two enforcement mandates that govern the conduct of
all law enforcement officials in the state. The first requires the immigration
status of all arrestees be determined before release. 6 9 The second requires
"reasonable attempts" to be made to determine the immigration status of anyone
encountered in a "lawful stop, detention or arrest" if "reasonable suspicion
exists" that such person is unlawfully present in the United States, with the
proviso that certain forms of identification establishes a presumption of
citizenship or lawful presence. 70 As noted above, the expansiveness of these
mandates is certainly a cause for concern.n Yet unlike provisions of S.B. 1070
that create separate criminal penalties under state law, 72 these mandates

68 See Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof,
United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010) (No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB).
69 ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (Supp. 2010) ("Any person who is arrested shall have the
person's immigration status determined before the person is released."). The district court rejected
the state's argument that "any person" language in the statute, in context, actually means any
person reasonably suspected of being present in the country unlawfully. See United States v.
Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 999 (D. Ariz. 2010).
70
ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN.. § 11-1051(B).
71See Chin et al., supranote 54, at 17-18.
72 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1509 (creating a crime for the failure to carry immigration
registration papers); id. § 13-2929 (creating a state crime for a person in violation of a criminal
office to transport or harbor undocumented immigrants or encourage or induce them to come to
Arizona).
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ultimately envision some form of contact and coordination with federal
authorities. Though flawed they may be, at the very least they provide some kind
of structure and process with respect to how immigration issues are to be handled
as a matter of local law enforcement.
All of this affected the manner in which the federal government
challenged Arizona on the grounds of federal preemption. To be sure,
immigration enforcement is a federal responsibility. Moreover, with plenary
power over the issue, the federal government has the final word over immigration
policymaking. Nonetheless, whether these two enforcement mandates are
actually preempted by existing federal law is not as straightforward as it may first
appear. It might be an easier case if the federal government was able to focus
their arguments on the underlying conduct being mandated-to assert, for
example, that all local enforcement of federal immigration laws is foreclosed
without specific authorization or request by federal authorities. Yet in light of all
the various federal efforts to encourage local enforcement outlined above, this
proved to be a difficult argument."
It is telling then that rather than focusing on the underlying enforcement
actions themselves, what the federal government ultimately centered its case on
was the fact that Arizona was turning the federal government's encouragement
into a state-wide mandate.7 4 Indeed, its argument against these provisions rested
on the tremendous volume of inquiries and referrals that the mandates would
produce. On the one hand, the federal government argued that they would
impose an undue burden on legal residents and even American citizens, thus
frustrating the subtle balance of federal law.7 s It did not argue, however, that the
burdens imposed by the underlying action-inquiries at lawful stops or after
arrests-are themselves impermissible absent a statewide mandate. On the other
hand, the federal government asserted that the sheer number of inquiries and
potential suspects these mandates might produce would frustrate federal
administration by taxing its capacity and possibly diverting resources from other
priorities. All of this is made worse by the fact that Congress requires the federal

See supranotes 64-66 and accompany text; see also Chin et al., supranote 54, at 29 (arguing that
the preemption argument is "potentially at issue here, because the states do have some authority
over immigrants, and there is no statute by which the United States has excluded states from
regulating noncitizens entirely").
74 Actually, the main focus of the federal government's argument was more subtle and theoretical.
In short, rather than focus on any provision in isolation, the federal government argued that the law
as a whole constituted an act of policymaking, and more specifically an attempt by a state to
The ability to make immigration policy, however, is
fashion its own immigration policy.
constitutionally reserved to the federal government in consideration of the interests of the nation.
See Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof,
supra note 68, at 12-22. The district court refused to consider this argument on its own and as
applied to S.B. 1070 as a whole. See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 995-98 (D.
Ariz. 2010).
75 See UnitedStates v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 1001, 1003-04.
73
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government to respond to all immigration inquiries.76 Both of these arguments
prevailed at the district court level.n As a result, both of these enforcement
mandates were preliminarily enjoined.
To be sure, when this case reached the appellate level, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals adopted an argument different from the one raised by the
federal government in affirming the district court's injunctions. Rather than
focusing on S.B. 1070's burden on federal resources or its frustration of federal
enforcement priorities, the appeals court interpreted federal immigration law to
require the close supervision of the Attorney General whenever states are
involved in the enforcement of immigration laws. This supervision, the court
held, is to be instituted primarily through memorandum of understandings
negotiated between the federal and state governments under the federal 287(g)
program. There are some problems with the panel's holding in this regard,
especially given the fact that 287(g) agreements are relatively rare and Congress
seems to have gone out of its way to suggest that 287(g) supplement but do not
supersede other federal encouragement of independent police action. For our
purposes, however, it is worth noting that although the underlying rationale is
different, like the district court's opinion, the legal line for the court of appeals
is not whether local law enforcement officials communicate with federal
authorities, but rather the creation of policies and laws that "dictat[e] how and
when state and local officers must communicate with the Attorney General
regarding the immigration status of an individual." 80 Moreover, as Judge Bea
noted in his partial dissent, even at this level of the litigation, the federal
government still refused to assert that line-level officers cannot independently
participate in immigration enforcement on their own.8 In this respect, although
the legal foundation of the appellate court differed from that of the district court,
the underlying conclusion that federal law preempt state-wide policy mandates,
but not necessarily the exercise of individual police discretion in the field,
continues to hold.
Of course, one may ask what, if anything, does the ongoing litigation
over Arizona's immigration law have to do with the scope of local
policymaking? True, the federal lawsuit is against a state and not a locality.
More importantly, it was instituted by the federal government with substantial
local support; declarations from several local law enforcement officials in
Arizona were filed as a part of the federal government's case 82 and seven cities
See id.at 1001-02, 1005-06.
" See id.at 1002, 1006.
78 See United States. v. Arizona, No. 10-16645, 2011 WL 1346945, at *5 (9th Cir. Apr. 11,
2011).
7 See id. at *24-*25 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
76

so See id. at *6.
81 See id.at *35 (Bea, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82 See Declaration of Roberto Villasenor, United States v. Arizona,

703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz.
2010)
(No.
CV
10-1413-PHX-SRB),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/docurnents/declaration-of-roberto-villasenor.pdf;
Declaration
of
Phoenix Police Chief Jack Harris, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D. Ariz. 2010)
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recently filed an amicus brief in support of the federal government's position on
appeal.83 In that respect, federal success actually frees local law enforcement
departments from the state's mandate. Yet, it is worth noting that neither the
scope nor nature of the federal government's argument are so cabined, and it
would arguably apply as easily to local policies as those enacted at the state level.
Indeed, many existing policies now fall into similar molds described in the
federal government's lawsuit against Arizona. Albuquerque, for example,
recently "repealed" its sanctuary policy by requiring that all arrestees have their
immigration status checked, though the mayor was quick to stress that police will
not check the immigration status of any victims or witnesses. 84 Houston, which
mandates that police officers not detain or arrest anyone solely on the basis of
suspicions of undocumented status, nevertheless requires that the police check all
arrestees against a database that includes information on immigration status. 85
The immigration policy in Denver, which we examined above, also reveals a
similar combination of enforcement limits and enforcement mandates. Again, it
may be that these policies are unwise. According to the federal government's
argument, however, they may also run afoul of federal preemption. Indeed, the
fact that local law enforcement will be working in collaboration with federal
authorities to determine immigration status, and thus potentially tax and divert
federal resources, makes a local policy more rather than less problematic under
the federal government's argument. Moreover, although local policies in most
cases will not impose burdens as extensive as those with statewide effect, there
are nevertheless many local jurisdictions with sizable populations, including
some that approach or exceed that of Arizona as a whole.
By casting doubt on the constitutionality of enforcement mandates, this
development suggests a further narrowing of permissible local immigration
policymaking more generally. More importantly, this narrowing seems to be
accompanied by a corresponding expansion of individual police discretion.
Again, this does not appear to be an oversight. Rather the manner in which the
challenge bifurcates local law enforcement officials and their agencies, and
supports the discretion of the former at the expense of supervision by the latter, is
a central reason for the government's novel argument. The fact is the federal
government has little desire to argue that law enforcement officials cannot make
(No. CV 10-1413-PHX-SRB), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/declaration-ofjack-harris.pdf; Declaration of Tony Estrada, United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D.
at
available
10-1413-PHX-SRB),
CV
(No.
2010)
Ariz.
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/declaration-of-tony-estrada.pdf.
83 Brief for the County of Santa Clara, California et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the Appellee,
United States v. Arizona, No. 10-16645, 2011 WL 1346945 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 2011), availableat
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2010/10/25/amicus.brief2 1.pdf.
8 See Dan Boyd, Policy on Immigrants Assailed, ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 4, 2011,
http://www.abqjournal.com/news/xgr/04210152005newsxgrO2-04-1 .htm.
85 See Circular from Harold L. Hunt, Chief of Police, to the Houston Police Department, Persons
at
available
2006),
10,
(Oct.
Laws
Criminal
Violate
Who
see also Glenn, supranote 4.
http://static.texastribune.org/media/documents/hpdcircular.pdf;
86
See supranotes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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the kind of inquiries that the Arizona law requires. As we have seen, both federal
law and federal practice encourages individual police officers to do so with or
without departmental approval. The federal government has at times entered into
formal 287(g) arrangements with local law enforcement that are structured
around the kind of inquiries that Arizona's law requires, especially regarding
those who are detained. So, as rare as they may be, it could be that the federal
government simply wants enforcement to proceed through these bilateral federal
agreements rather than unilateral state mandate, as the Ninth Circuit argued in its
opinion. Yet federal law not only seems to support the possibility of independent
police action, but it also appears that the federal government is not entirely
willing to limit such action solely to the scattered instances where a formal
agreement has been reached. As a result, the federal challenge focused entirely
on the mandate rather than the underlying police conduct. In that sense, the
federal position here is strikingly similar to the one it assumed in the passage of
the federal anti-sanctuary statute: law enforcement officials should have the
ability to participate in immigration enforcement efforts or decide not to, but no
one, including the police department for whom they work, is allowed to
undermine that choice in any way.
In combination with the anti-sanctuary movement, the emerging
controversy about potential limits over enforcement policies places local
policymakers in a confused and difficult situation. Indeed, possibly none find
themselves in more of a legal limbo than the localities and law enforcement
agencies in Arizona. The early success of the lawsuit against the Arizona law
meant that they are freed from having to engage in federal immigration
enforcement. But because the expansive anti-sanctuary statute in S.B. 1070 was
neither directly challenged nor subsequently enjoined, local law enforcement
agencies cannot legally take any steps to prevent their officers from enforcing
immigration laws or risk being sued through the newly created cause of action.
Nor, as suggested above, would local policies that lean towards tailored
enforcement mandates as a limit or control on police discretion necessarily
escape scrutiny. In the end, however, local law enforcement agencies in Arizona
may be just the first to be so mired in this legal limbo. Given the state of federal
law and the direction in which it and other state laws are developing, it is not
clear that cities and police departments in other jurisdiction will be able to avoid
being placed in a similar position.

IV. POLICING POLICE DISCRETION
Taking seriously the legal convergence of the two legal developments
outlined above-restrictions on local policies that either limit or require
cooperation with federal immigration enforcement efforts-it is no wonder that
efforts to actually define how line-level officials should respond to immigration

8

Seghetti, supranote 10, at 14-18.
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in the course of local policing seem so uncertain. Moreover, when combined
with the public controversy that seems to plague any local policy on immigration
and policing, it is no surprise that the policies that exist remain under-enforced, if
not unwritten or unpublicized.8 8 All the while, by not addressing individual
police discretion, that discretion is actually enhanced in practice as the local and
departmental policies that constrain it are being called into question.
This development is troubling. What, if anything, can be done about it?
The face is that there are no easy answers. The most obvious candidate for the
development of a centralized and uniform immigration policy is through direct
federal or state mandates, which are unfortunately plagued by constitutional
limitations. Alternatively, local policymaking could tap into the pragmatism and
managerial expertise that many local law enforcement agencies possess, but this
would ultimately require less intrusion into their ability to set policies, which is
not the direction in which current legal developments are now heading.
A. The Limits of Centralized Control
Given the haphazard and politicized manner in which limitations against
local policymaking are emerging, one might suppose that what is necessary is a
coordinated and concerted effort to define the role of local law enforcement with
respect to immigration-namely, an effort that involves more than banning local
policies from being promulgated. What may be needed is a centralized and
uniform guidelines specifying what procedures local law enforcement should
follow, and the criteria that they should consider, with respect to immigration
issues that they may encounter in the field. The federal level, of course, would
be an ideal level for the promulgation of these policies not only because
immigration is a national interest, but also because this would be the best way to
ensure uniform standards and procedures across the country. Alternatively, it
may be assumed that the states, being significantly less numerous than local
police jurisdictions, would be a second best option.
As a means of controlling police discretion in an area of national interest,
federal or even state control might be more ideal than a patchwork of
departmental standards. Yet the prospect of guidelines more precise than what
has been passed so far may be legally constrained by the structural organization
of our federal system. Simply stated, while the federal government has the final
word on immigration regulation and enforcement, it has limited ability to actually
impose specific mandates on local law enforcement officials. Conversely, while
the states have substantially more power over local law enforcement officials,
they lack the ability to set immigration policy more generally. Let us consider
these limitations in more detail.
While the prospect of a clear and transparent federal policy regarding the
conduct of all local law enforcement officials sounds appealing, it is unlikely that

88 See

sources cited supranote 36.
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one can be implemented in a comprehensive manner without running afoul of the
constitution. The limitations are inherent in how our federal system insulates
state and local governments from federal intrusion. As the Supreme Court
famously proclaimed, state sovereignty means that the federal government cannot
command states or localities to promulgate laws or regulations or get around
these protections by commandeering state or local officials directly into
administering a federal program.89 Thus, although the federal government has
been allowed to preempt local enforcement restrictions or even enforcement
mandates, it is not clear that they can expressly set the terms, conditions, and
procedures with which federal immigration enforcement must be carried out by
law enforcement officials at the local level.
The states, of course, are not constitutionally limited in the same manner.
To be sure, their ability to mandate local action may be constrained by other
restrictions in their respective state constitutions. Yet, for the most part, it is
generally assumed that as subdivisions of the state, localities and local officials
are entirely under the control of the state. State policymaking in this regard,
however, runs afoul of constitutional limitations. As the federal lawsuit over
Arizona's immigration law shows, the fact that states are better situated to
effectuate local action does not give them the ability to use that power to affect
federal immigration policymaking more generally. Ultimately, any state policy
must be in accordance with federal law, and more importantly as a political
matter, federal priorities if they want to avoid being stricken or bogged down by
federal opposition. And given the diversity of state responses, and the confusion
over what is in fact the federal position, any state policies would likely face
federal challenge.
I do not want to suggest that there is no way to develop a centralized
policy on the role of local law enforcement in the context of immigration
enforcement. Conditioning the receipt of federal funds on state and local
compliance with a particular local immigration enforcement procedure is one
possibility, if only Congress can come to an agreement on what such a procedure
might be. 90 Another is if the federal government and the states reach a mutual
consensus where states voluntarily implement a uniform policy on local
immigration enforcement, which is much more unlikely given the even more
strained relationship between the federal government and the states on this
matter. In any case, these options have thus far not been the preferred course of
action for either the federal government or the states. All the while, concerns
about police discretion in immigration matters remain.

89 See cases cited supranote 56.

9 A more expansive federal anti-sanctuary provision, passed by the House but not the Senate in
2006, was structured precisely in this manner. See Matt Stiles et al., House Puts Pressure on
"Sanctuary" Cities:Rep. Culberson'sMeasure Threatens to Cut off Funding,Hous. CHRoN., June
30, 2006, at Al.
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B. Reaffirming Local Policymaking
If a uniform and centralized immigration policy at the federal level
regarding the role of local law enforcement is the gold standard, local
policymaking may still be an appealing substitute. At the very least, it would
allow for the development of some transparent policy to guide police discretion
than having none at all. In other words, if, as the above suggests, political and
legal constraints make the emergence of a truly comprehensive policy at the
federal or state level unlikely, perhaps local policymaking as either a second (or
third) best alternative should not be so easily dismissed. To be clear, I do not
mean to suggest that there are no additional benefits that local policymaking
might bring to the table; in fact, I have stressed these arguments in the past to
defend giving localities more control over immigration. 9 1 But even if one is
dismissive of those arguments, I want to suggest here that there should still be
grounds for consensus around the idea that some clear standards are better than
none. And as the law currently stands, the entities most likely to develop these
policies are at the local level.
In the short run then, the easiest way to ensure that some policy exists is
to rethink the way the federal government and the states are micromanaging local
law enforcement administration through restrictions and prohibitions. Of course,
clear ceilings and floors should be set to ensure policies do not go too far, either
in infringing individual rights or directly frustrating federal interests. Yet there is
no more certain way to accomplish this than for these restrictions to target the
underlying action that is of concern (e.g., inquiries about immigration status at
routine traffic stops, or on the basis of race) rather than simply the local policies
that require or prohibit these actions. Indeed, as it stands now, by discouraging
or outright prohibiting only the act of local policymaking itself, all that recent
developments have accomplished is to make the alternative of having no policy
at all more appealing.
There are real concerns that encouraging or even permitting local
policymaking may result in some very bad policies. They certainly will result in
patchwork of enforcement responses across different jurisdictions. But bad
policies are at least open to debate and subject to revisions, none of which are the
case when immigration enforcement is largely at the discretion of individual
police officers or informal departmental customs. 9 2 Tellingly, whereas the
federal government and the states now appear locked in a grand political battle
over the most basic aspects of immigration law, local policies have been steadily
evolving as various communities try to adjust to the realities of immigration's
impact on policing and community safety. For some, this may not be sufficient
But until a more
to recommend local policymaking above all else.

91See Clare Huntington, The ConstitutionalDimension of Immigration Federalism,61 VAND. L.

REV. 787, 844-49 (2008); see also Su, supranote 7, at 366-75.
92See Luna, supra note 19, at 1164.
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comprehensive solution can be reached, this may be precisely the kind of
pragmatic backstop that we need to preserve.
V. CONCLUSION
The role of local law enforcement officials in immigration regulation and
enforcement is far from settled. Indeed, it is and will likely continue to be a
subject of fierce debate and substantial legal confusion, all of which tracks the
Under these
contentiousness of the immigration debates as a whole.
circumstances, it makes sense that the federal government and the states have
become increasingly interested in regulating the manner in which local law
enforcement agencies conduct, or fail to conduct, immigration enforcement in
their jurisdiction. Yet, as this essay shows, by targeting local immigration
policymaking exclusively, these regulations not only narrow the ability of
localities and local law enforcement agencies to control police discretion and the
abuses that might arise from insufficient supervision of how that discretion is
exercised in the field.
There are, to be sure, political points to be scored by targeting local
immigration policies, especially those that make the greatest effort to be clear
and transparent. But by discouraging local immigration policymaking, and also
not being able to put an alternative procedure in place, federal and state efforts in
this regard simply increase the likelihood of confusion and abuse to the detriment
of immigration regulations and policing more generally. This essay suggests that
we need to rethink this regulatory trend. Local policymaking may not seem to be
the most efficient or effective way to determine the role of local police officers
with respect to immigration enforcement. It should, however, be preferable to
having no policies at all, which happens to be precisely the direction in which the
emerging restrictions on local policymaking are pushing.

